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SOCIAL MEANING AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS
NEAL DEvINs*
The more things change, the more they seem to stay the same: In
1981, I wrote a paper on the constitutionality of school vouchers for
a law school course. At the time, it appeared that a sharply divided
Supreme Court would reject vouchers, five to four. Two decades
later, it appears that a sharply divided Supreme Court might well
uphold vouchers, five to four. For this very reason, academics and
others continue to fill the pages of law reviews with competing
analyses of whether school vouchers violate the Establishment
Clause.' Far more tellingly, during the 2000 elections, Court
watchers claimed that the winner of the presidential race would
control the constitutional fate of school vouchers (by, presumably,
appointing the Justice who will cast the deciding vote in a
constitutional challenge to school vouchers).2
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Public Policy, College of William & Mary.
This Essay builds upon my remarks at the 2000 Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium,
"Religion in the Public Square." Thanks to Jon Arena, Amanda Dulin, and Carrie Klitzke
for helping me research this Essay. Thanks also to Dave Douglas, Jim Dwyer, and
participants at a University of Minnesota Law School workshop for helpful comments.
1. Compare,e.g., Michael W. McConnell, G-overnments,Families,and Power:ADefense
of EducationalChoice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847 (1999) (defending constitutionality of school
choice), and Ira C. Lupu, The IncreasinglyAnachronisticCase Against School Vouchers, 13
NOTRE DAI IEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 375 (1999) (same), with Marci A. Hamilton, Power,
the EstablishmentClause,and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807 (1999) (arguing that vouchers
are a demand from powerful religious interests and, as such, may violate the Establishment
Clause), and Laura S. Underkuffiler, Vouchers and Beyond: The IndividualAs Causative
Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000) (depicting voucher
plans as an effort to circumvent the prohibition against direct aid to sectarian schools). See
also Jesse H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL

CONTROVERSY 235, 259 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) ("Whether
the present Supreme Court would find that the Establishment Clause forbids the
participation of parochial schools [in choice programs] appears to depend on Justice
O'Connor, who may well be influenced by the specific details of the challenged system.").
2. See William Safire, Vouchers Help Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,2000, at A23 (noting
Al Gore's opposition to vouchers and that"[l]itmus.testily," Gore "indicatedthat his Supreme
Court choices would vote against voucher's constitutionalitf); Stuart Taylor Jr., The War
Over the Supreme Court: How Bush or Gore Could Tip the Balance, NEWSWEEK, July 10,
2000, at 18.
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That much of the ongoing fight over the constitutionality of
vouchers appears little more than rote repetition of decades-old
constitutional arguments cannot be denied. Yet this superficial
similarity belies a critical difference between today's voucher wars
and those of the early 1980s. Over the past two decades, the social
meaning of school vouchers has undergone a radical transformation.' In part, this change is about context: increasing
emphasis on market-based solutions to social problems, the demise
of court-ordered school desegregation, the "secularization" of
Catholic schools, and changing attitudes of parents, especially
minority parents, towards vouchers. But this change is also about
the text of voucher plans, that is, targeted plans that benefit a
limited number of parents whose children attend failing schools
instead of across-the-board plans that benefit any parent sending
her child to a private school.
In the pages that follow, I will detail the changing social meaning
of school vouchers and, in so doing, explain why the classic
arguments against vouchers seem less salient today than ever
before. For example, the claim that vouchers would circumvent
school desegregation no longer makes sense. With courts
increasingly giving up on mandatory busing, racial isolation in
public schools is a far more severe problem today than it was
twenty years ago. For this reason, vouchers are often seen (by
African Americans and others) as a way to improve the lives of
minority students in a world without court-ordered desegregation.
Likewise, the claim that vouchers do little more than subsidize
religious parents who opt out of public schools has, in significant
respects, been overtaken by a broader debate over school reform.
Voucher proponents rarely talk about the inequities of compelling
religious parents both to subsidize public education and to pay the
cost of private religious education.4 The focus, instead, is on the
propriety of market-driven solutions to a failed public school
system. For their part, most voucher opponents talk not about the

3. The terminology that I employ in this Essayis drawn, in part, from Lawrence Lessig,

The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cu. L. REv. 943 (1995).
4. See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem:AbortionsandReligious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991).
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wrongness of the state's facilitating private religious 5instruction,
but instead about the need to invest in public schools.
Before turning to this proof of changing social meaning, I will
explain why social meaning does and should matter to the Supreme
Court. In particular, I will argue that social meaning affects the
Justices' understanding of the facts and, as such, appropriately
influences the application of preexisting standards of review as well
as the decision to recalibrate those standards in favor of alternative
ones.
I. SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW6
Just as the Supreme Court leaves its mark on American society,
so are social forces part of the mix of constitutional law. True, the
Justices work in a somewhat insulated atmosphere. But, as Chief
Justice William Rehnquist reminded us, the "currents and tides of
public opinion... lap at the courthouse door,"7 for "judges go home
at night and read the newspaper or watch the evening news on
television; they talk to their family and friends about current
events. " ' As such, "j] udges, so long as they are relatively normal
human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public
9
opinion in the long run than can people working at other jobs."
Constitutional decision making, moreover, is a dynamic process
that involves all parts of government and the people as well.
Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the military,
the Court understands that it must act in a way that garners public
acceptance. Its power, as the Justices themselves admit, lies in its
5. For a discussion of opposing arguments, see Matthew Miller, A Bold Experiment to
Fix City Schools, ATLANTC MONTHLY, July 1999, at 15; Gary Rosen & Critics, Are School

Vouchers the Answer?, COMMNTARY, June 2000, at 16. Indeed, even law review critiques of
voucher plans place increasing emphasis on policy, not legalistic, arguments. See, e.g.,
Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare as
We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493 (1999).
6. Portions of this section are drawn from Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial
Exclusivity and PoliticalInstability,84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998).
7. William H. Rehnquist, ConstitutionalLaw and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 751, 768 (1986).

8. Id.
9. Id.; see alsoMax Lerner, Constitutionand Courtas Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290,1314
(1937) ("[Jludicial decisions are not babies brought by constitutional storks, but are born out
of the travail of economic circumstance.").
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"legitimacy," that is, "the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as
[being] fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare
what it demands." 0 This emphasis on public acceptance of the
judiciary seems to be conclusive proof that Court decision making
cannot be divorced from a case's (sometimes explosive) social and
political setting. 1
A more telling manifestation of how public opinion affects Court
decision making is evident when the Court reverses itself to
conform its decision making to the social and political forces beating
against it. Witness, for example, the collapse of the Lochner Era
under the weight of changing social conditions.' Following Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's 1936 election victory in all but two states, the
Court, embarrassed by populist attacks against the Justices,
announced several decisions upholding New Deal programs. In
explaining this transformation, Justice Owen Roberts recognized
the extraordinary importance of public opinion in undoing the
Lochner Era: "Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court
could have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards
throughout the country-for what in effect was a unified
economy."13
Social and political forces also played a defining role in the
Court's reconsideration of decisions on sterilization and the
eugenics movement, state-mandated flag salutes, the Roe v. Wade
trimester standard, the death penalty, states' rights, and much
more.14 Absent popular support, these decisions proved ineffective.
In the end, as Justice Robert Jackson wrote, "Itihe practical play of
the forces of politics is such that judicial power has often delayed
10. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992); see also Tom R.Tyler &
Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of DiscretionaryLegal Authority: The
United States Supreme Court and AbortionRights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 715 (1994) ("[Plublic
acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution.. enhances public
acceptance of controversial Court decisions.").
11. SeegeneraUy LOUISFISHER&NEALDEVINS, POUTIcALDYNAMICSOFCONMTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 2000).
12. Much of the same can be said of the demise of strict separation in church-state
matters. See infra notes 116-22 (detailing demise of strict separation). As detailed in Part H
ofthis Essay, many of the concerns which animated strict separation review have given way
to an era of accommodation and pluralism.
13. OWENJ. ROBERTS, THE COURTANDTHE CONSTITUTION: THE OLrVERWENDE-LHOIMES

LECTURES 61 (1951).
14. For support of these claims, see Devins & Fisher, supranote 6, at 95 nn.79-84.
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but never permanently defeated the persistent will of a substantial
majority."' Consequently, for a court that wants to maximize its
power and legitimacy, taking social and political forces into account
is an act of necessity, not cowardice.
Beyond politics, courts have good reason to take into account the
changing social meaning of the issues before it. When the "facts
[underlying an earlier decision] have so changed, or come to be seen
so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification," 6 a workable system of jurisprudence
demands the repudiation of the old rule. In explaining its
overturning ofLochner-Era decisionmaking, for example, the Court
pointed to the Depression and, with it, "the lesson that seemed
unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation of
contractual freedom protected in [Lochner-Eradecisions] rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a
relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human
17
welfare."
Short of overturning earlier precedent, courts canlook to changed
social meanings when applying the same legal rule. Needless to say,
the more flawed the underlying facts of the earlier decision, the
more likely it is that courts will reach dramatically different
conclusions. For example, after the American Psychiatric
Association reversed itself in 1973 by concluding that homosexuality is not a psychopathic condition, the courts also reversed
course."8 In rejecting Immigration and Naturalization Service
claims that homosexuals were "ineligible aliens" by virtue of their
"mental defect," the courts looked to science's changed
understanding of homosexuality in sorting out the meaning of
"mental defect."19
15. Robert H. Jackson, MaintainingOurFreedoms: The Role of the Judiciary,19 VITAL
SPEEHES OF THE DAY 759, 761 (1953).
16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
17. Id. at 861-62. For a critique ofthis reasoning, see Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment,and
Economic Liberty: Mr. JusticeSouter and the Mistranslationof the Due Process Clause, 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 3,35-44 (1999).
18. For a summary of the evolution of the American Psychiatric Association's views on
homosexuality, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365,
1397-98 (1997).
19. See Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal.
1982), afftc, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
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Education policymaking exemplifies the Court's willingness to
take social and political forces into account in its decision making.
Take the case of school desegregation. Beginning with Brown v.
Boardof Education, ° the Supreme Court allowed its perceptions of
elected government preferences to shape its decision making in this
area. In an effort to temper southern hostility to its decision, the
Court did not issue a remedy in the first Brown decision. One year
later, the Court issued a weak-kneed remedy, recognizing that
"varied local school problems" were best solved by "[sichool
authorities" and that delays associated with "problems related to
administration" were to be expected.2 By again taking into account
potential resistance to its decision, the Court engaged in the type of
interest-balancing that has set political parameters on judicial
participation in equal educational opportunity.2 2
Social and political forces, especially federal government efforts
to enforce Brown during the 1960s, also figured prominently in the
Supreme Court's approval of mandatory busing remedies inSwann
v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education.' Swann, however,
went well beyond elected government preferences. During the
Nixon and Reagan administrations, the Court and the elected
branches of government fought a pitched battle over busing, a battle
that has now abated. In 1991, and again in 1992, the Supreme
Court recognized greater state and local control over public schools
and, in so doing, narrowed its controversial hard-line position on
24
busing.

U.S. 574 (1983) (concluding that, afterBrown v. BoardofEducation,discriminatory schools
did not serve the public interest and, consequently, were ineligible for federal tax breaks).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955).
22. I develop this point in some detail elsewhere. See The JudicialRole in Equality
Decisionmaking,in REDEFINING EQUALITY 218 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds.,
1996).
23. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
24. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-92 (1992) (identifying several factors that
supervising district courts should consider when relinquishing control over the
implementation of a desegregation plan); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,250 (1991)
(recognizing that once a school district complies with a desegregation decree, federal courts
no longer retain control over regulatory policy and rules).
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In signaling an end to the era of mandatory busing, the
Rehnquist Court did more than honor elected-branch preferences.
The social meaning of school desegregation had undergone a radical
transformation in the 1970s and 1980s. White flight from the cities
to the suburbs and, with it, a diminution in the property tax base
of inner-city schools cast doubt on the soundness of busing.
Furthermore, opinion polls suggested that the minority community
disfavored busing. Rather than expansive judicial intervention,
minority interests typically favor magnet school programs,
vouchers, and other education-related expenditures.' Given the
absence of support for mandatory assignments and other intrusive
remedies, it is little wonder that the courts themselves would tire
of continuing judicial supervision of school systems.
The story of school desegregation is relevant for another reason.
It calls attention to the fact that private-school controversies, for
the most part, are public-school controversies. We care about the
racial composition of private schools because it tells us something
about the racial makeup of the public schools. Similarly, student
performance in private schools serves as a gauge for the quality of
instruction in public schools. Finally, the Supreme Court's
recognition, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2" that parents have a
right to send their children to private schools hinges on the public
schools' function as an inculcator of values and, with it, the state's
power to teach those moral lessons it deems important.
The 1983 Bob Jones University v. United States 7 decision exemplifies this situation. In affirming an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) ruling that denied tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
private schools, the Court emphasized that these schools cannot
serve a public function: "[The] legitimate educational function [of
such schools] cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices ....
Discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire
educational process."" This language extends to private schools the
universal nondiscrimination principle of Brown. At the same time,
25. See Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School
DesegregationIssues, in REDEFINING EQUALITY, supra note 22, at 120, 127.
26. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
27. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
28. Id. at 593-94 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,468-69
(1973)). For further discussion, see infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
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by refusing to allow civil rights interests to challenge IRS
enforcement of this nondiscrimination requirement in Allen v.
Wright,29 the Court refused to become the engine for the pursuit of
numerical justice. Like Bob Jones,Allen v. Wright was a product of
its times, specifically, the nation's growing skepticism of mandatory
busing and, with it, the use ofmajority-minority population ratios.S3

That the Court takes social and political forces into account
cannot be denied. What is often overlooked, however, is that the
tugs and pulls of politics make the Constitution more durable. In
other words, absent the constraints imposed by social and political
forces, the Court's constitutional judgments will be less relevant
and hence less stable. Indeed, were the Court to see its
constitutional decision making as definitive, the Constitution (and
the Court) would suffer. As Alexander Bickel observed: "No good
society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principleridden."3
Judicial supremacy yields unworkable solutions, not a more
equitable world. "[Glovernment by lawsuit," Justice Jackson wrote,
"leads to a final decision guided by the learning and limited by the
understanding of a single profession-the law." 2 Consider, for
example, the willingness of democratic institutions to resist Court
rulings on abortion, affirmative action, busing, child labor, the
death penalty, flag burning, the legislative veto, school prayer,
voting rights, and religious liberty.3 Were judicial supremacy to
rule the day, there is good reason to think that such challenges
29. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
30. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,AbusingStanding:A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 635 (1985) (suggesting that the Court's denial of standing to civil rights plaintiffs was
a by-product of its views of the case's merits). It is also noteworthy that the Court, inMillihen
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), refused to hold nondiscriminating schools in surrounding
suburban communities responsible for purposeful segregation in a city's school system. As
such, a decision sanctioningnondiscriminatingprivate schools forfailingto enroll a sufficient
number of minority students would hold private schools to a higher standard than public
schools.
31. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,49 (1961).
32. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMAcY: A STUDYOFA CRISIS

IN AMERICAN POWER POLrIcs 291 (1941).
33. See Devins & Fisher, supranote 6 (discussing several of these episodes).
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would still take place. The only difference is that the political
branches and the people would act in defiance of the Court,
declaring something to be the policy of the nation irrespective of the
Court's constitutional judgment. It is therefore difficult to see how
judicial supremacy would promote stability or nullify majoritarian
control of transcendent questions."'
Complex social policy issues, especially those that implicate
constitutional values, are best resolved through "the sweaty
intimacy of creatures locked in combat.""5 Judges and politicians
sometimes react differently to social and political forces. Congress,
for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the claims of large
populous interests, or on the claims of the wealthy and the
powerful, since that tends to be the best route to reelection." 6
Courts, in contrast, are less affected by these pressures, for judges
possess life tenure. Accordingly, because special interest group
pressures affect courts and elected officials in different ways, a fullranging consideration of the costs and benefits of different policy
outcomes is best accomplished by a government-wide decisionmaking process. For this reason, courts and elected officials both
should be activist in shaping constitutional values.
Consider, for example, the school voucher debate. If the social
meaning of school vouchers has undergone a radical transformation, say, between 1980 and 2000, a court considering the
constitutionality of vouchers today might reach a different
conclusion than one that considered the same question in 1980. For
this very reason, had the Supreme Court outlawed an across-theboard voucher scheme in 1980, elected officials today would not
treat this decision as having decided, now and forever, the
constitutional fate of school vouchers.3 " Otherwise, constitutional
34. For a competing perspective, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
35. ALEXANDERK.BICIL, THELEASTDANGEROUSBRANCH: THE SUPREME COURTATTHE
BAR OF POUimCs 261 (1962).

36. Stephen G. Calabres Thayer's ClearMistake, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 269,273 (1993).
37. Witness, for example, the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Committee for Public
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The high-water mark of
separationist decision making, Nyquist turned down a New York plan allowing a tax credit
to low- and middle-income parents who send their children to private schools. Rather than
treat this decision as definitive, 2000-era voucher proponents have called upon the courts to
rethink the wisdom ofNyquist.
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decision making would become stagnant, reflecting the social facts
of a different era. Furthermore, by treating an earlier decision as
nonbinding and continuing to experiment with alternative voucher
schemes, a middle-ground solution might be reached. The Court, for
example, could sign off on a targeted voucher scheme, something
that is both politically popular and not fraught with the same
constitutional infirmities as an across-the-board voucher scheme.
In this way, the Court and elected officials would work together in
shaping a constitutionally permissible voucher scheme that is right
for the times.
Courts, like elected officials, cannot escape "[tihe great tides and
currents which engulf" the rest of us. 8 Rather than definitively
settling transcendent questions, courts must take account of social
movements and public opinion. By steering a course that fits within
the permissible limits of public opinion, the Court maintains its
strength. Under this view, as Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it, judges
"participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and
with the people as well." 9
II. THE CHANGING SOCIAL MEANING OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS
What then of school vouchers? Are they little more than an
attempt to circumvent Brown's universalistic demand that there be
neither white nor black schools, "but just schools,"40 or are they a
market-based solution to the problem of single-race inner-city
schools? Correspondingly, who are the principal beneficiaries of
vouchers? Are they religious parents who would otherwise send
their children to sectarian schools, or poor parents whose children
are trapped in failing public school systems? And, for that matter,
what is the mission of sectarian schools, especially Catholic schools?
Is it the inculcation of religious teachings, or are these schools
religious in name only? Finally, what of educational quality? Do
private schools do a better job of educating children, or is the
question, ultimately, one of choice, that is, the desire to eliminate
38. BENJAMIN J. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 168 (1921).
39. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198
(1992).
40. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,442 (1968).
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financial roadblocks standing in the way of parents who prefer to
send their children to private schools?
The answers to these questions are relevant, as the above
analysis suggests, because they define the social meaning of school
vouchers. 1 The more voucher schemes appear to be about the
education of children, especially African Americans, the less reason
there is to think that either the Establishment or Equal Protection
Clauses should stand in the way of voucher experiments. Put
another way: Is the fault line in today's voucher wars defined
principally by religion and race, or, alternatively, does the battle
over vouchers pit defenders of privatization and markets against
teacher unions and others who believe in government-delivered
public goods? If the battle, ultimately, is about "markets and
schools," it is a policy battle. As such, courts should be reluctant
about interceding in this fight-at least until there is reason to
think that issues of race and religion are defining the social
meaning of school vouchers.4 2
My thesis, suggested in the introduction to this Essay, is that the
social meaning of school vouchers has undergone a radical
transformation over the past two decades.4 3 In this section, I will
sketch out this transformation. By calling attention to the ways
that the 1980 conversation about vouchers now seems entirely
beside the point, I will show that courts should be open to 2000-era
voucher experiments.

41. Social meaning and social facts are criticallyimportant inthe religion area. Consider
the so-called "endorsementr test championed by Justice O'Connor. Writing in Lynch v.
Donnelly, for example, Justice O'Connor proclaimed that whether a particular religious
display constitutes an endorsement of religion is "in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis ofjudicial interpretation of social facts." 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984).
42. My point here is that courts should allow government to experiment with vouchers.
That way the social meaning of school vouchers can be defined by real-world experience, not
speculation. See Lessig, supra note 3 (suggesting that courts have reason to defer to
government when the social meaning of government decision making is contested).
43. Voucherproposalsvarydramaticallyand, as such, their social meaningwill also vary.
With that said, reflective of dramatic shifts in education policy, church-state relations, and
much more, voucher proposals enacted in the past few years all seem cut from the same
cloth. See infra notes 178-92.
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The World in 1980
Nineteen eighty was a watershed of sorts for school vouchers.
With the Moral Majority, Christian Coalition, and other members
of the so-called Religious Right coming "out of the pews into the
polls,"'" Ronald Reagan, in his 1980 presidential campaign, embraced school prayer, creationism, and tax breaks for religious
schools.45 Once elected, Reagan wasted no time repaying his debt to
the Religious Right. Through his appointments power, he sought to
transform Supreme Court decision making. Perceiving that "the
fate of our democracy is intimately intertwined... with the vitality
ofthe Judeo-Christian tradition,"46 Attorney General Edwin Meese,
Education Secretary William Bennett, and Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork called for a "relaxation of curren[tly] rigid," "somewhat
bizarre," "secularist doctrine."47 In particular, Reagan nominees
(unsuccessfully) sought to undo both Engle v. Vitale, the 1962
school-prayer decision,4" and a 1971 ruling, Lemon v. Kurtzman,49
that severely limited state efforts to assist parochial schools.
In the midst of his administration's campaign to recalibrate
judicial decision making, Reagan made several bully pulpit
speeches to religious conservatives. In 1982, remarking that "God
should [never] have been expelled from the classroom," he
demanded that the Constitution be amended to permit individual
or group "prayer in our public schools and institutions." 0 Also in
1982, the Reagan administration sought to restore the tax-exempt
status of Bob Jones University, a school that tied its segregationist
44. Anatomy of a Landslide, TIME, Nov. 17, 1980, at 31 (quoting Jerry Falwell); see also
Peter L. Berger, Democracy and the Religious Right, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1997, at 53, 55
(discussingthe Religious Right's "determination to try to gain power through the Republican
Party").
45. See 1980 RepublicanPartyPlatform,36 CoNG. Q.ALMANAC 58-B, 62-B to 63-B (1980).
46. Neal Devins & Benjamin Feder, Reading the Establishment Clause, COMMONWEAL,
Sept. 20, 1985, at 492 (quoting William Bennett).
47. Response Preparedto White House Analysis of JudgeBork's Record, 9 CARDOzO L.
REV. 219,283 (1987) (quoting Judge Bork: "Arelaxation of current rigidly secularist doctrine
would... permit some sensible things to be done"); Devins & Feder, supra note 46, at 492
(quoting Edwin Meese).
48. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
49. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
50. President's Message to the Congress Transmitting a Proposed Constitutional
Amendment on Prayer in School, I PUB. PAPERS 647-48 (May 17, 1982).
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practices to religious conviction. In so doing, the administration
honored its campaign pledge to "halt the unconstitutional
regulatory vendetta launched by Mr. Carter's IRS Commissioner
against independent schools." 5 Specifically, under Carter, the IRS
had sought to tie federal tax-exempt status to the proportionate
representation of minority students in private schools-a decision
that prompted 150,000 angry letters from the burgeoning Christian
school movement. 52
But just as the Carter administration miscalculated the potency
of the Religious Right (and, more generally, America's growing
discomfort with numerical justice), the Reagan administration lost
sight of both the power of civil rights interests and the nation's
commitment to simple nondiscrimination. With more than 500,000
students circumventing school desegregation remedies by attending
segregated private schools in the South,5" the Reagan policy shift
touched a raw nerve. Subject to a barrage of criticism from
newspapers, Congress, and civil rights groups, the administration
backtracked, submitting legislation to Congress prohibiting the
granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
organizations.5 The damage, however, was done. For example,
when testifying on a proposed 1982 amendment to the Voting
Rights Act, Reagan's Attorney General, William French Smith,
prompted a "hearing room full of civil-rights activists [to] erupt[]
into laughter" by contending that "the President doesn't have a
discriminatory bone in his body.'"
Further damaging his relationship with the civil rights
community, President Reagan appointed nominees who "[did not]
worship at the altar of forced busing and mandatory quotas" to his

51. 1980 Republican PartyPlatform,supranote 45, at 63-B.

52. This episode is discussed in Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination:Federal
RegulationofPrivateEducationby the InternalRevenueService, in PUBLIcVALUEs,PRIVATE
ScHooLs 133, 143-45 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989).
53. See Note, The JudicialRole in Attacking Racial Discriminationin Tax-Exempt
PrivateSchools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 378, 378 n.3 (1979); see also DAVID NIVEN & ROBERT E.
BILLs, THE ScHooLs THAT FEAR BUILT (1976).
54. See Presidenfs Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, I PUB.
PAPERS 34 (Jan. 18, 1982).
55. Chester E. Finn, Jr., "AffirmativeAction" Under Reagan, 73 COMIENTARY 17, 27
(1982).
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top civil rights posts.' For the administration, busing "ha[d] failed
57
to advance the overriding goal of equal educational opportunity"
and, consequently, should have been replaced with "voluntary
student assignment program[s], magnet schools," and the like.58
Moreover, as part of its New Federalism in Education, the
administration called for the end of targeted federal relief to school
systems subject to busing orders.59 In its place, the administration
proposed a new education block grant, allowing states-who would
receive lump sum federal support-to establish their own
priorities.60
By emphasizing state and local control, the administration once
again signaled its desire for education policy to be defined outside
the Washington D.C. beltway. For much the same reason, Reagan
provoked the ire of teachers unions and others by calling for the
elimination of the federal Department of Education.6 More
generally, by making a commitment to an antiregulatory agenda,
rather than substantive expertise in the relevant program, the
critical prerequisite to a presidential nomination, the administration sought to launch a revolution that would transform
government.62 By seeing themselves in the midst of a holy war,
however, administration appointees were often their own worst
enemies.6" As caricatured by Reagan's first Education Secretary, T.
H. Bell, these "extremists" would say: "Let the chaos come.... This
is part of the revolution! Pragmatism is cowardice and weakness!"'
56. Stephen R. Weisman, Reagan Strongly Defends Policies on Minority and Women's
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1983, at Al (quoting Ronald Reagan).
67. School Desegregation:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong. 618 (1981) (statement of William
Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).
58. Id. at 631.
59. See generally Neal Devins &James B. Stedman, New FederalisminEducation:The
Meaningof the Chicago School DesegregationCases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243 (1984).
60. See id. at 1244.
61. Cf ROBERT DALLEK, RONALD REAGAN: THE PoLITICS OF SYMBOLISM 87-88 (1999).
62. See GEORGE E. EADS & MICHAEL FIX RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN'S REGULATORY
DILEMMA 140-46 (1984).

63. On civil rights matters, for example, administration efforts to dismantle affirmative
action were an abject failure. See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1723, 1749-63 (1991).
64. Terrel H. Bell, Education Policy Development in the Reagan Administration,PmI
DELTA KAPPAN, Mar. 1986, at 487, 491.
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When it came to school vouchers, for example, Reagan
administration efforts fell short.' In 1983 and 1985, Congress
refused to act on administration proposals enabling poor children
to receive vouchers worth roughly $600.66 While the administration
argued "that private enterprise should be encouraged to help
provide services now delivered by Government agencies,"
Democrats and Republicans in Congress both denounced the
proposal.
What would have happened, however, if the administration had
convinced lawmakers to enact voucher legislation? More to the
point, would courts have understood such legislation as being
consistent with, or anathema to, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause and school desegregation decision making? The
answer, I think, is obvious: In the early 1980s, the social meaning
of school vouchers could not be reconciled with the values of equal
educational opportunity or church-state separation.
First and foremost, Reagan's call for school vouchers appeared
part and parcel of his embrace of religious interests. Like his
campaign to return God to the public schools, and his efforts to
neuter the public school bureaucracy through the abolishment of
the Department of Education as well as New Federalism in
Education programs, Reagan's private school initiatives were aimed
at religious parents disaffected by the "secularization of society and
the supposed breakdown of morality that was thought to be its

65. I do not mean to suggest that Reagan saw school vouchers as a way to pay off the
Religious Right. For the Religious Right, what mattered most was getting the government
out of "God's classrooms."See NealDevins, FundamentalistSchools v. TheRegulators,WALL
ST. J., Apr. 14, 1983. School vouchers, instead, were part and parcel of Reagan administration efforts to emphasize market-based solutions, as well as to gain approval among
religious parents. See Radio Address to the Nation on Taxes, the Tuition Tax Credit, and
Interest Rates, I Pus. PAPERS 512, 512 (Apr. 24, 1982).
66. See U.S. to Push Planto Payfor PrivateSchooling, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10,1985, at 27;
see also Robert C. Bulman & David L. Kirp, The ShiftingPoliticsofSchool Choice,in SCHOOL
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROvERSY, supranote 1, at 36, 44. In 1983, Congress also turned
down an administration-supported measure to provide a $300 income tax credit for tuition
payments to private elementary and secondary schools. See U.S. to Push Plan to Pay for
PrivateSchooling, supra, at 27.
67. Robert PearReaganProposes
Vouchers to Give PooraChoiceofSchools, N.Y. TMEs,
Nov. 14, 1985, at A20.
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consequence." 8 For example, Reagan's effort to restore Bob Jones
University's tax-exempt status was designed to placate those
Christian evangelicals who had opposed the "unconstitutional
regulatory vendetta" of the Carter IRS. 9 More tellingly, in justifying school vouchers, Reagan spoke of the inequity of religious
parents "supporting two school systems and only using one."70
Beyond the unmistakable religious overtones of Reagan's
campaign for vouchers, an early 1980s voucher would have had a
destabilizing effect on race relations.71 By opposing mandatory
busing, defending the grants of tax breaks to racist schools, and
opposing affirmative action, the Reagan administration had
antagonized the civil rights community.72 For example, Benjamin
Hooks, then head of the NAACP, saw the President's policies as
bringing new "hardship, havoc, despair, pain, and suffering on
73
blacks and other minorities."
More significantly, with two 1979 Supreme Court decisions
reaffirming the Court's commitment to systemwide busing predicated on black-white student population ratios,7' the Court would
have greeted with skepticism a voucher plan that may well have
68. Kurt Anderson, For God and Country, TIM, Sept. 10, 1984, at 8, 9.
69. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
70. Radio Address to the Nation on Taxes, supranote 65, at 512. Reagan said: "In some
of our large cities, 40 percent of the parochial school students are from minority
neighborhoods. Their families pay their full share of taxes to fund the public schools.... I
think they're entitled to some relief since they're supporting two school systems and only
using one." Id.
71. I refer hereto an across-the-board voucher. But even a targetedvoucher-that is, one
in which only poor parents can participate-might raise the suspicions of the civil rights
community. For example, by allowing African American students to opt out of school
desegregation in favor of attending a predominantly black private school, Reagan's proposed
voucher scheme might have further isolated minority and white students.
72. For a partisan accounting of the numerous ways that the Reagan administration
provoked the ire of civil rights interests, see NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1988).
73. DALLEK,supranote 61, at 70; see also Leadership Conference on CivilRights, Without
Justice:A Reporton the Conduct ofthe JusticeDepartmentin CivilRights in 1981-82 (1982);
Washington Council of Lawyers, Reagan CivilRights:The FirstTwenty Months (1982); Finn,
supra note 55, at 17 (listing the condemnations of various civil rights interests).
74. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526,537-40 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,466-67 (1979); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Returnof ColorConsciousnessto the Constitution:Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 SUP. Or. REV. 1, 6
(noting that these decisions assume "that a neighborhood school policy, when combined with
any significant residential segregation, is unconstitutional").
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complicated judicial efforts to eradicate race discrimination in the
schools. Indeed, in the early 1980s, there was reason to think that
Catholic schools, which compose the majority of private schools in
the United States, contributed to racial segregation. A study of
black-white segregation in major cities found that "Catholic schools
[were] highly segregated" and that "there [was] no compelling
reason to think that a subsidy [or voucher] would reverse the
present pattern" of private school transfers increasing racial
segregation.75 In light of this evidence, it is hard to imagine the
Justices looking the other way in an effort to uphold school
vouchers. This conclusion seems inescapable when the Reagan
voucher proposal is considered against the backdrop of other
Reagan administration initiatives, including its calling for an end
to court-ordered busing and restoring the tax-exempt status of
76
avowedly segregationist schools.
There is another reason that the early 1980s Court would have
been reluctant to approve a voucher scheme. By calling for an end
to forced busing, a return to school prayer, and greater recognition
of the legitimate ways that the government can aid sectarian
schools, Ronald Reagan sought to transform the Court.7 7 But by
making the Court the issue, the Reagan administration effectively
asked the Court to do something that it is loathe to do, that is,
reverse itself under political fire. For the Justices, "a surrender to
political pressure' results in "profound and unnecessary damage"
to the Court.7 9 Indeed, the Court's habit is to adhere to precedent
and declare itself the final word on the Constitution's meaning
whenever it feels especially challenged by the other branches.8 0
Consequently, while taking stock of the social and political forces
75. Robert L. Crain & Christine H. Rossell, CatholicSchools andRacial Segregation,in
PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supranote 52, at 184,185. For a competing perspective,
see JAMES S. COLEnAN ETAL., HIGH SCHOOLACHIEVEMENT. Puic,
CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982) (concluding that although minorities are underrepresented in

private schools, such schools are nevertheless racially balanced).
76. See supra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.

77. Reagan, of course, sought to transform the Court in other ways-by, among other
things, calling for an end to abortion rights and a renewal of states' rights. See FISHER &
DEVINS, supra note 11, at 210-19 (abortion), 94-100 (federalism).
78. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).

79. Id. at 869.
80. For examples, see Devins & Fisher, supranote 6, at 64-65.
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surrounding it, the Court cannot lose sight of its institutional
legitimacy, that is, the "public acceptance of the Court's role as
interpreter of the Constitution."8 '

There is, I admit, a curious feature to the above analysis. Ronald
Reagan, not Jimmy Carter, won the 1980 elections. And if the spoils
go to the victor, why shouldn't the 1980 election have changed the
social meaning of school vouchers? To put it more bluntly: Civil
rights interests and teachers unions supported the losing side in the
1980 election; social conservatives supported the winning side.
Accordingly, rather than see the fight over vouchers as being about,
say, church-state separation, why not see it as being about the
repudiation of teachers unions which, after all, are special interests
"adamantly opposed to competition in their labor markets, and to
any policy that would shrink the market for teacher services"? 2
The answer, I think, is that critical elections-like Reagan's 1980
victory-play an instrumental role in changing social meaning. But
no election in and of itself defines social meaning. The 1980 election
did not mark the end of either teachers unions or civil rights
groups; instead, these special interests remained a potent force in
shaping public policy. Likewise, while the Religious Right came of
age in the 1980 election, the American voters did not consider 1980
to be a coronation of the Religious Right.
Over time, as the next section will show, the social meaning of
school vouchers did change. Ronald Reagan played a big part in this
change-by, among other things, questioning the wisdom of big
government and, with it, courts who would invoke the Constitution
to manage school systems or limit government efforts to assist
religiously based social services. In so doing, the "Reagan
Revolution" began a shifting of power to communities, families, and
markets to assume the responsibilities of big government. Also
contributing to the changing social meaning of school vouchers has
81. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 715.
82. MYRON LIEBERMAN, THE TEACHER UNIONS 5 (1997); see also Myron Lieberman, The
Ruminations of a Right-Wing Extremist, 80 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 229, 230 (1998) (noting that
the NEA and the AFT, the two largest teachers unions, do not oppose privatization when it
comes to settlinggrievances and disputes: "they [only] oppose privatizationwhenthe services
of union members or NEA and AFT allies are involved").
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been the "secularization" ofreligious schools, a growing recognition
that students in general, and minority students in particular, may
benefit from school choice (especially 2000-era proposals that target
students who attend failing schools), and a realignment of power
and attitude among Catholics and southern Protestants (the very
core of the Religious Right). Finally, unlike 1980, the federal
judiciary is today more receptive to this changing social meaning.
By appointing Justices more accepting of church-state partnerships
and more skeptical of court-managed social reform, Reagan (and to
alesser extent George H.W. Bush) helped reshapejudicial attitudes
towards school vouchers."
The World in 2000
Like 1980, the 2000 election proved to be a watershed for school
vouchers. Ballot initiatives in Michigan and California made clear
that the school choice movement is (at least for now) a potent
political force."' Furthermore, the presidential campaign revealed
vouchers to be a wedge issue: Al Gore, strongly backed by teachers
unions, adamantly opposed vouchers; George W. Bush, looking to
opinion polls showing support for vouchers among parents of public
school children, embraced vouchers for students attending failing
schools.' Unlike 1980, however, today's voucher wars barely
consider the ways in which voucher schemes either advance
powerful religious interests or, undermine court-ordered desegregation. Those arguments appear-to politicians, journalists,
and most Americans at least-a relic of times past.
With forty-nine states having launched significant initiatives to
improve academic standards in public schools, 8 vouchers have been
83. Consider, for example, Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991), and
Agostini v. Felton,521 U.S. 203,236 (1997). InDowel, four of the five Justices who voted to
limit court-ordered busing were either appointed or (in the case of Chief Justice Rehnquist)
elevated by Presidents Reagan and Bush. In Agostini, Reagan and Bush appointed or
elevated all five of the Justices who voted to overturn a 1985 decision, Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985), which had severely limited federal aid to sectarian schools.
84. See V-Day for Vouchers, ECONOMIST, July 15-27, 2000, at 27.
85. See id.; see also Kenneth J. Cooper, Teachers Unions arePoised to Boost Turnoutfor
Gore, WASiL POST, July 6, 2000, at A9, availablein 2000 WL 19617968. On the role of
teachers unions in opposing school choice, see Bulman & Kirp, supranote 66, at 46-47.
86. See Reality Check 2000, EDuC. Wk., Feb. 16, 2000, available at http'J/
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subsumed into the larger national debate about how best to run our
schools. Indeed, when researching this Essay, I looked extensively
for popular-press stories commenting on the ways in which
politicians discussed the constitutionality of vouchers. For the most
part, I searched in vain.87 This is not to say that law professors,
interest group lawyers, and spokespersons for teachers unions do
not have an opinion (one they no doubt would gladly share) about
the constitutionality of vouchers; rather, it is to say that reporters
do not bother asking these folks what they think about the
constitutional fate of voucher proposals. Consider, for example, a
New York Times story about election-year politics. After noting that
"[no self-respecting candidate" can give a stump speech without
appearing as if they are "running for school board," the story listed
vouchers as simply one of several types of reform proposals being
bandied about.' School desegregation, church-state.relations, or the
near-certainty of a constitutional challenge to vouchers did not even
merit a mention in the story.
Why is it that the social meaning of school vouchers has
undergone such a radical transformation? What follows is an
elaboration of the various explanations that I suggested in the prior
section.
The End of School Desegregation
American schools are more racially segregated today than thirty
years ago. 9 In particular, by signaling its disapproval ofmandatory
busing, the Rehnquist Court paved the way for the dismantling of

www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm.
87. Some legal analysts made mention of the uncertain constitutional fate of voucher
proposals, and one op-ed writer suggested that a Gore victory would result in the
appointment ofantivoucherJustices. See supranotes1-2 and accompanying text. Butin light
of the thousands of stories written about education policymaking, these stories are barely a
drop in the bucket-especially considering the success that voucher opponents have had in
judicially challenging school choice proposals.
88. Randal C. Archibold, On the Stump, Hot Topic is Education,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
2000, at 27.
89. Gary Orfield, The Growth ofSegregation:AfricanAmericans, Latinos,and Unequal
Education,in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.BOARD OF
EDUCATION 53-55 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
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court-ordered school desegregation. 0 Following these decisions,
several major school districts began phasing out their desegregation
plans, including Boston, Buffalo, Charlotte, Cleveland, Denver,
Kansas City, Las Vegas, Nashville, and Oklahoma City.91 By 1997,
nearly 70% of African American students and 75% of Latinos
attended schools that were predominantly African American or
Latino, with one-third of minority students attending schools in
which 90% or more of their classmates were African American or
Latino.92 Furthermore, a 1999 Gallup Poll found that 60% of both
African Americans and whites opposed "stepping up efforts to
integrate white students with minority students," preferring,
instead, to increase "funding and other resources for minority
schools.""
African Americans, especially in recent years, see vouchers as a
way out of underfunded, failing public schools. A poll by the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies found that vouchers were
supported by 60% of African Americans overall and 70% of African
Americans under 35.94 In Wisconsin, where a significant voucher
experiment is underway in Milwaukee, 73% of low-income African
Americans support the program.95
90. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
91. WendyParker, The Futureof School Desegregation,94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157,1157-58
(2000); Tamara Henry, Is School DesegregationFading?,USA TODAY, July 22, 1999, at Al.
With that said, reports of the death of school desegregation may be premature. In a recent
study of Fifth and Eleventh Circuit school desegregation cases, for example, Wendy Parker
convincingly demonstrates that most "school desegregation litigation continues, with no hint
of impending termination." Parker, supra, at 1159. At the same time, as Parker concedes,
this state of affairs is largely a by-product ofinertia, that is, the unwillingness of the school
board to pursue the termination of school desegregation orders. Parker, supra, at 1159-60.
92. See Jon Marcus, State Sued Over Poor Students' Conditions, TIMES EDUC.
SUPPLEMENT, June 2, 2000, at 12; see also Gary Osfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in
American Schools, at http://www.law.harvard.edulgroups.civilrights/publications/
resegregation99lhtmL
93. Henry, supra note 91 at Al; see also Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence ofBlack
and WhiteAttitudes on SchoolDesegregationIssuesDuring
The FourDecadeEvolutionofthe
Plans,36 WM. & MARYL. REV. 613, 643-45 (1995) (citing survey data showing that African
Americans endorse the end of busing).
94. See V-Day for Vouchers, supra note 84, at 27 (citing poll results); see also Sari
Horwitz, Poll Finds Backing for D.C. School Vouchers; Blacks Support Idea More Than
Whites, WASH. PoST, May 23,1998, at Fl, availablein 1998 WL 11581968 (noting that 60%
ofAfrican Americans expressed support for vouchers, while only 43% of whites did).
95. See Nina Shokraii Rees & Sarah E. Youssef, School Choice 1999: What's Happening
in the States, BACKGROUNDER, No. 1246, Jan. 27, 1999, at 4.
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For African Americans and other minorities, school vouchers are
seen as part of the solution, not the problem. That voucher
programs now target poor, overwhelmingly minority communities
plays a large part in explaining this changed attitude." That courtordered reforms, if ever successful, have run their course sheds
additional light on this shift in opinion. Whatever the explanation,
when it comes to equal educational opportunity, the social meaning
of today's school voucher experiments is resoundingly positive.
The ChangingFace of SectarianEducation
Over the past three decades, the demographics of private
education have been turned upside down. In part, there is far less
reason to fear vouchers benefitting segregationist academies that
justify their exclusionary policies in the name of religious
conviction. Following the Reagan administration's debacle in Bob
Jones University,97 it is unimaginable that these schools would be
allowed to participate in any voucher scheme. Moreover, the raisond'etre of segregationist academies was court-ordered busing, a
practice that has given way to Rehnquist Court decisions favoring
local control in education and, with it, neighborhood schools.98
Of far greater significance, school choice proposals can no longer
be cast as a spoils system benefitting politically powerful Catholic
parents. Catholic schools no longer dominate the world of private
schooling.9 In the early 1970s, two-thirds of all private schools were
Catholic schools. 00 In some states, more than 90% of students
96. See infra notes 178-92 and accompanying text (describing some voucher programs).
At the same time, there is a danger in an open-ended voucher plan. For example, noting that
"African-American and Latino students in impoverished areas ... will [disproportionately]
lose out in any real competition" for slots to high-quality private schools, Martha Minow and
other voucher critics are correct in arguing that choice reforms "could undermine equality
goals unless there are direct efforts to maintain and enforce them." Martha Minow,
Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257,280-81 (1999). Perhaps for this reason,
Kweisi Mlfume, president of the NAACP, has broken rank with most African Americans,
dubbing vouchers a "terrible threat." See Miller, supranote 5, at 15.
97. See supranotes 51-55 and accompanying text.
98. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
99. For the most comprehensive treatment of this subject, see ANTHONY S. BRYKETAL.,
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS ANDTHE COMMON GOOD (1993). For a law review article that makes good
use of Bryk's findings, see Lupu, supra note 1.
100. See Diane Gertler & Linda A. Barker, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,

2001]

SOCIAL MEANING AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS

941

attending private schools went to Catholic schools, a fact that
greatly influenced the Supreme Court in a string of 1970s decisions
limiting state aid to private schools. 1 Specifically, perceiving that
powerful Catholic interests pushed for government aid to help
finance a Catholic-only school system, the Court struck back,
severely limiting such aid by speaking (without meaningful
empirical support) "about the pervasive religious indoctrination
thought to accompany the system of Catholic education."'0 2
By the late 1990s, roughly 30% of private schools were Catholic,
with one-half of all private school students attending them. 0 3 More
strikingly, between 1970 and 2000, the number of non-Catholics
attending Catholic schools had grown from 2.7%to 13.4%.04 In fact,

at some Catholic schools (including Catholic schools participating
in Milwaukee's voucher experiment) non-Catholics outnumber
Catholic students. 5 All in all, it is nearly certain that the majority
of today's sectarian school students are non-Catholic.
The major impetus for change in Catholic schools was 1965s
Vatican II, an ecumenical council that "has been aptly described as
a paradigm shift from medievalism to postmodernity in the images
of the Church and its relationship with the world.""0 6 Through its
pastoral constitution, The Church in the Modern World, Vatican II
placed increasing emphasis on the social mission of the Church and,
with it, the need to dialogue with all people, including adherents to
other faiths.0" Accordingly, the Catholic Church has become more
Statisticsof Nonpublic Elementary Schools, 1970-71, at 5-10 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,234 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 610 (1971); Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602, 608 (1970).
102. Lupu, supranote 1, at 385. Ironically, Catholic schools, in significant measure, came
of age at the turn ofthe twentieth century, a time when anti-Catholic prejudice essentially
compelled the creation of a separate school system. See David B. Tyack, The Perils of
Pluralism The Backgroundof the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968).
103. See Stephen P. Brougham & Lenore A. Colaciello, PrivateSchool Universe Survey,
1997-98, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, Oct. 1999, at 2 fig.1, 3 fig.1.
104. See Timothy Egan, The ChangingFace of Catholic Education,N.Y. TmInS, Aug. 6,
2000, § 4A, at 28.
105. See id. (discussing one such school where 80% of the students were non-Catholic).
Many ofthese non-Catholics are ProtestantAfrican Americans. See William Sander, Studies
Vouch for Private Schools, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1999, at 21, available in 1999 WL
6519761.
106. BRYKETAL., supra note 99, at 46.
107. See id. at 48.
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public in its functions, creating, if you will, "a massive impetus
towards the deprivatization of religion,"' that is, a chiseling-away
of the "reigning structures that have long organized understandings
of religious and secular life."'0 9
From 1970 to 2000, Vatican IUs influence has been extraordinary.
Starting in the 1970s, many parents rejected Catholic schools that
pursued then-popular innovations like an expanded personal
development curriculum."' Because of increasing openings in their
schools, Catholic educators pursued their "broadly shared
institutional purpose of advancing social equity" by reaching out to
(often non-Catholic) inner-city students."' Over the past thirty
years, moreover, there has been a precipitous decline in the number
of priests and nuns, resulting in an overwhelming number of lay
teachers in Catholic schools. Specifically, between 1960 and 1995,
the number of religious and ordained staff per thousand Catholics
dropped 54%.11' By 1998, over 90% percent of Catholic school
teachers were lay persons."' Furthermore, most of these teachers
were under the age of forty-five and thus had been educated in the

108. Ruti Teitel, Vouchsafing Democracy: On the Confluence of Governmental Duty,
ConstitutionalRight, andReligious Mission, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmIcs &PUB. POLY. 409,
414 (1999).
109. Id. Teiters concern is far broader than changes in the Catholic Church spurred on by
Vatican II. See generally Jost CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS INTHE MODERN WORLD (1994)
(discussing the deprivation of religion, including analysis and comparison offive case studies
from four different countries).
110. See BRYKET AL., supra note 99, at 300.
111. Id. It may also be the case that Catholic educators have watered down their religious
message, in part to reach out to non-Catholics. For this very reason, some fear that vouchers
"could become a Trojan horse for government meddling in private education," Joe Loconte,
Payingthe Piper,POLY REV., Jan. 1, 1999, at 30, availablein 1999 WL 8573517, and, as
such, could undermine the mission of religious schools. See id.; see also James G. Dwyer,
School Vouchers:Inviting the Public Into the Religious Square,42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963
(2001) (arguing that children's interests are served by voucher plans that see to it that all
private schools satisfy state-prescribed standards); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil
Society: School Vouchers, ReligiousNonprofit Organizations,and LiberalPublic Values, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 436 (2000) (noting and ultimately endorsing the need for sectarian
schools that receive vouchers "to redefine themselves as institutions and communities more
attuned to public values").
112. See Joseph Claude Harris, Supply, Demand,and ParishStaffing, AMERICA, Apr. 10,
1999, at 16.
113. See Leonard DeFiore, CatholicSchoolsEnjoy a Renaissancein '90s, NAT'L CATH.REP.,
Mar. 27, 1998, at 24, available in 1998 WL 10326488.
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post-Vatican II era.11 4 Furthermore, an exponential rate of
interfaith marriages is contributing to the changing face of the
Catholic Church and, with it, Catholic schools." 5 None of this is to
say that Catholic schools have somehow become sanitized of
religion. Rather, it is to say that the social meaning of attending a
Catholic school has changed. Today, these schools-reflecting
Vatican H, market forces, and a diminishing clergy-are less
overtly religious and, consequently, more a melting pot of different
faiths and beliefs.
Religion and the PublicSchools
Over the past two decades, religion has played an increasingly
visible role in the nation's public schools. The "political, religious
and legal forces that had briefly converged to produce the wall of
separation [between church and state] began to collapse," so that
separationism had been replaced by a "new vision of equal
treatment... which[, while embracingreligious expression,] insists
that [the] religious activity should be initiated and controlled by
individuals rather than by the state."" 6 Witness, for example, the
1984 Equal Access Act (Act)," 7 legislation that prohibits any public
secondary school receiving federal funds from denying equal access
to students who wish to conduct a meeting devoted to religious
objectives."' Frequently referred to as the "godson of school
prayer,"1 9 the Act responded to perceived "State hostility toward
religion."' As Jerry Falwell said: "We knew we couldn't win on
school prayer but equal access gets us what we wanted all along."' 2 '
In particular, as Act sponsor Jeremiah Denton observed, because of
114. See BRYKETAL., supranote 99, at 143-44.
115. See James D. Davidson, Outside the Church. Whom Catholics Marry & Where,
COMMONWEAL, Sept. 10, 1999, at 14.

116. Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2000, at 40.
117. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994).
118. See id. § 4071. In 1990, the Supreme Court upheld this legislation, holding that
Congress had every right to conclude that "religious speech in particular was valuable and
worthy of protection." Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990).
119. 130 CONG. REC. H7725 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Ackerman).
120. S.REP. No. 98-357, at 12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348,2358.
121. 130 CONG. REC. H7725 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement ofRep. Schumer quoting

Jerry Falwell).
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court rulings "there was a sealed door to keep any practice of
religion out of the schools. Now that seal has been broken."' 2
The Act is revealing for another reason. In 1984, the Equal
Access bill appeared to be little more than special interest
legislation designed to placate the Religious Right. Indeed, after
church-state separationists helped stall the bill in Congress, Ronald
Reagan-at the behest of the Religious Right-worked overtime for
its passage. Specifically, by threatening to veto a massive school aid
bill, Reagan helped push The Act through Congress." s By 1995,
however, The Act had won wide support throughout the nation.
Noting that he "never believed that the Constitution required our
schools to be religion-free zones, or that our children must check
their faith at the schoolhouse door," 2 4 Bill Clinton directed
Education Secretary Richard Riley to issue guidelines regarding
religious 5expression to every school superintendent in the
country. 1
Participation in religious activities also appears to be on the rise.
Challenge 2000, an umbrella group of about fifty Christian youth
organizations, estimates that more than 10,000 student-run
Christian clubs exist in the nation's secondary schools. 6 For
example, more than 3 million students now gather around their
school flagpoles to pray.' s These on-campus activities, according to
a 1998 WashingtonPost report, "reflect how, after years of national
confusion, anger and litigation sparked by the Supreme Court's
1962 [school prayer] ruling, a broad new consensus has emerged on
122. James E. Wood, Jr., EqualAccess: A New Directionin American Public Education,
27 J. CHURCH & ST. 5, 10 (quoting Sen. Jeremiah Denton).
123. Cf Statement on Signing the Education for Economic Security Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1129, 1130 (Aug. 11, 1984) ("It has been the consistent policy of this administration to
support the right of students... to meet voluntarily for religious purposes in school facilities
124. TomMashberg, GuidelinesforSchoolsBoostReligiousGroups, BOSTONHERALD, Dec.
19, 1999, at 8, availablein 1999 WL 3416783 (quoting Bill Clinton).
125. See Memorandum on Religious Expression in Public Schools, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1083,
1085 (July 12, 1995).
126. See Stephen Braun, Divide in Schools is More than Spiritual, L.A. TIhmEs, May 9,
1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 2425859; Caryle Murphy, At Public Schools, Religion
Thrives: Students of All Faiths Increasingly Active, WASH. POST, May 7, 1998, at Al,
available in 1998 WL 11579080.
127. See Alana Baranick, Teens Tuned to a HigherPower, CLEV. PLAINDEALER, Sept. 17,
1998, at 1B, available in 1998 WL 4154250.
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what is permissible and forbidden when it comes to religion in
public schools. "'
Further reflecting the changed social meaning of religion in the
public schools, many school districts across the nation are beginning
to offer classes on the Bible as literature as well as discussing the
impact of religion on Western civilization. 9 Though these classes
remain rare, there are more of them than ever before, especially
because a growing number of educators and interest groups view
30
teaching about the Bible as "vital to a well-rounded education."
Consequently, while the Supreme Court remains steadfast in
3
refusing to allow state-sanctioned prayer in the public schools,' 1
there is a far greater recognition today (as compared to 1980) that
religion plays a vital, beneficial role in the lives of public school
students. In this way, the public school norm of separatism has
given way to one of religious pluralism, that is, the idea that, while
it may not embrace a particular religious practice, government
ought to facilitate private expressions of religious faith." 2
Accordingly, as compared to 1980, there is far less reason to see
vouchers as a wedge separating overtly religious private schools
from completely secularized public schools.
128. Murphy, supranote 126, at A18.
129. See Mireya Navarro, Florida Case Highlights Conflicts on Use of the Bible as a
Textbook, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File.
Notwithstanding this renewed interest in the religion-based instruction, the vast majority
of public school systems treat religion-based topics as anathema to public schooling. For a
survey and analysis, see Jay D. Wexler, Beyond the "New Consensus": Teaching About
Religion and the Challenges of Civic Education (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
130. CraigTimberg,Bible'sSecondComing:ScripturesReturningtoPublicSchoolsas
Text
forHistoryand Literature,WASH. POST, June 4,2000, at Al, availablein 2000 WL 19612663.
By way of contrast, studies released in the mid-to-late 1980s found that religion had been
systematicallyexcludedfromthe public schoolcurriculum. See, e.g.,O.L.DAIS,J.,LOING
AT HISTORY: A REvIEW OF MAJOR U.S. HISTORY TEXTBOOKs 3-4, 11 (1986); PAUL C. VITZ,

RELGIONANDTRADrTONALVALUFsINPUBLiC SCHOOLTEXTBOOES:ANEMPUMCALSTUDY 3-7
(1985).
131. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Sys. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that high
school policy authorizing school prayer at a football game violated Establishment Clause).
132. For a critical assessment of this evolution, see Martha McCarthy, Religion and
Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?,75 IND. L.J. 123 (2000). See also John 0.
McGinnis, Creating Orderfrom Below: The Supreme Court's New Jurisprudenceof Social
Discovery (describing Santa Fe and other 1999-2000 decisions as part of a pervasive
movement towards decentralization and private ordering) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with William and Mary Law Review).
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Religion & Politicsin the New Millennium
Two thousand-era church-state relations are different for another
reason. Unlike two decades ago, when Ronald Reagan's private
school initiatives seemed inextricably linked to his campaign debt
to the New Right, there is far less reason to look at vouchers as
being a handout to powerful religious interests.3 3 In part, as I have
already suggested, this is a by-product of the increasing emphasis
on nondenominational outreach programs by the Catholic Church
and other religions, as well as changes in the practices of both
Catholic and public schools.' 34 Correspondingly, public expressions
of religious faith no longer seem out of place in the public square.
Joseph Lieberman
Indeed, Democratic vice presidential candidate
135
was celebrated for his public religiosity.
There is, however, another explanation for this phenomenon,
namely, the changing realignment of religious interests in
American politics. Today, there is no longer a group-the Religious
Right-that dominates public discourse about church-state
relations. And while the Religious Right remains a factor in politics,
it appears a shadow of its former self.136 Christian activists who
once sought to "remake the secular world in God's image now seek
only to escape that world. " 13 1 Furthermore, recent years have

witnessed a reversal of southern Protestants on the question of
state aid to religion. Rather than opposing such aid, southern
133. I do not mean to suggest that Reagan's embrace of school choice initiatives was
championed by the Religious Right, but rather that the social meaning of Reagan's private
school initiatives, including vouchers, was linked to Reagan's alliance with religious
interests.
134. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
135. See Charles Krauthammer, When LiberalsGet Religion, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2000,
at A33, availablein 2000 WL 25414723.
136. For arguments that the Religious Right is no longer powerful, see Michael Kelly, The
ChristianRight: Past its Prime,WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at A17, availablein 2000 WL
2288153; Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. TImES, Feb. 27, 2000, at 34. For an
argument that the Christian Right is still powerful, see MarkJ. Rozell,.. . OrInfluentialas
Ever?, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at A17, availablein 2000 WL 2288154.
137. Kelly, supra note 136, at A17. Correspondingly, over the course of the past two
decades, the Religious Right-notwithstanding its rhetoric to the contrary-has had
relatively little influence on American politics and society. See AndrewM. Greeley& Michael
Hout, Measuringthe Strength ofthe ReligiousRight, 116 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 810 (Aug. 25,
1999).
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Protestants now support it. The explanation lies in "a broader
religious realignment
involving the rise and fall of anti188
Catholicism."
All of this suggests a greater willingness on the part of religious
interests to both tolerate and work with each other. For example,
in pushing through the enactment of legislation designed to provide
broad statutory protections for religious liberty, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, the Coalition for the Free Exercise of
Religion spanned "ideological and religious lines," 9 making it "one
of the broadest coalitions ever assembled to support a bill before
Congress.""4 By working together this way, fears of a single
religious group's (whether it be the Religious Right or the Catholic
Church) capturing the White House or Congress have given way to
religious pluralism and toleration. As such, there is less reason for
the Court to view the Establishment Clause as a mechanism to
protect relatively weak religious interests from powerful ones.
Instead, the changing face of church-state relations suggests that
the Court should take a more accommodationist stance to state aid
to religious organizations."'
Privatization
Over the past two decades, the idea that government will provide
for education and other basic needs has collapsed "as liberals and
conservatives lost confidence in the ability ofgovernment to provide
138. Rosen, supranote 116, at 42. It is also noteworthy that Ralph Reed and other leaders
of 2000-era evangelical politics have worked hard at purging racism from their ranks. See
generally NiNA J. EASTON, GANG OF FIVE: LEADERS AT THE CENTER OF THE CONSERVATIVE
CRUSADE (2000). In particular, by preaching religious tolerance and racial diversity, the
Religious Right has muted much of the divisiveness that characterized church-state
relations.
139. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2000
(Nov. 16, 1993).
140. 139 Cong. Rec. S14362 (daily ed. Oct. 26,1993) (statement of Senator Hatch). In City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. But the Courts decision was not at all about fears of church-state
entanglement. See Neal Devins, How Not to Challengethe Court,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645
(1998) (arguing that the Court's decision was tied to its desire to protect its institutional
turf).
141. For arguments that the era of strict separation is over, see McConnell, supra note 1,
at 852-59; Rosen, supra note 116, at 40.
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welfare and education services in the inner cities."'42 In its place,
increasing reliance on privatization of the public sector has taken
hold. This privatization movement is profound. Grounded in
increasing skepticism of centralized government's ability to produce
anything but special interest legislation, the private sector is now
looking to "decentralize the setting of social norms and subject them
to more rigorous forms of competition."' School choice, whether it
be vouchers, charter schools, or the turning-over of public schools
to private businesses, is part and parcel of this movement towards
privatization. In this way, the social meaning of school choice has
been transformed by "a tidal change in the role of governments in
providing for basic human needs."144
This ongoing shift away from the social reforms of the New Deal
and Great Society dates back to the deregulatory initiatives of the
Carter Administration, although it was not until the Reagan
Administration that the deregulation movement began in earnest.
For Reagan, the war against Big Government took the shape of,
among other things, a Task Force on Regulatory Relief and a
determination to appoint agency heads on the basis of the fervency
of their belief in downsizing government.1 45 By 1992, the
privatization movement had taken hold.' Bill Clinton, running
as a "New Democrat," embraced this ideology.' 47 By 1995, The
142. Rosen, supranote 116, at 42; see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Causesof the Recent
Turn in ConstitutionalInterpretation,DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) (copy on file with author).
143. McGinnis, supra note 132, at 2ms. The Supreme Court, sensitive to this shift, has
embraced decentralization and private ordering by, among other things, reviving federalism
and protecting and facilitating civil and religious associations. See id.
144. Minow, supra note 5, at 499; see also id. at 500 ("Taking the place of social welfare
guarantees are policies intended to harness the competitive efficiencies of the free market
and to promote individual consumer choice.").
145. See EADS & FIX, supra note 62; Ed Magnuson, Three Steps Forward,Two Back- A
Balance Sheet on Reagan'sEfforts to DeregulateAmerica, TzME, Aug. 29, 1983, at 12.
146. At the very least, the rhetoric of government had changed. George H.W. Bush, for
example, spoke at length about deregulation while launching a significant expansion of
government's regulatory power. See Jonathan Rauch, The Regulatory President,23 NAT'LJ.
2902 (Nov. 30, 1991). For my purposes, it does not matter whether government in fact
privatized. My argument concerns the changing social meaning of school vouchers, not
whether people's beliefs about privatization are mistaken.
147. See Democrats'Document has Echoes of Perot,ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 13, 1992,
at A10, availablein 1992 WL 10607842 (stating that the draft Democratic platform included
the phrase "[w]e reject the big government theory that says we can hamstring business,
create a program for every problem and tax and spend our way to prosperity.") (emphasis
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Economist reported that "[e]very year privatisation gains in
popularity in America .... Once seemingly unassailable redoubts of
the public domain have been conquered." 148 In 1996, public
administration scholars bemoaned "the recent glorification of the
private market and the demonization of public bureaucracy," noting
that such a shift in attitude has "created a considerable challenge
to the intellectual credibility, norms, and integrity of public
" 149
administration as a field of study.
When it comes to education, this distrust of bureaucracy has

manifested itself in one of two entirely predictable ways. For public
schools, there is an increasing emphasis on standards-whether
it be comprehensive examinations or meatier curriculum
requirements." 5 Furthermore, there is an increasing emphasis on
private-sector solutions, including charter schools, vouchers, and
the turning-over of public schools to the Edison Project and other
nationwide contractors.' 5 ' In particular, by leaving it to parentsnot bureaucrats-to play a leadership role in defining their
children's education, modern-day reforms perceive schools as
markets and parents as consumers who will do right by their
152
children.

added); Democrats'PlatformDraftCriticizes'BigGovernment,' Cm. TRIB., June 26, 1992, at
5, availablein 1992 WL 4494969 (noting that '[the 1992 platform reflects an effort by some
Democrats to move away from old-style liberalism, rooted in the political orthodoxy of the
New Deal and labor unions, and toward a more centrist position").
148. PriuatizationSold!, ECoNOmiSt, Aug. 19,1995, at 25.
149. M. Shamsul Haque, The Intellectual Crisisin Public Administrationin the Current
Epoch of Privatization,27 ADMIN. & SoC'Y 510, 510-11 (1996). By September 2000, The
WashingtonPost reported that "more than three private contract jobs have been created for
every two federal jobs lost to downsizing from 1993 to 1999." Spencer S. Hsu, Death of 'Big
Government' Alters Region, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL
25414095.
150. See Leon BotsteinA Tyranny of StandardizedTests, N.Y. TIMS, May 28, 2000, § 4,
at 11.
151. CompareJohn E. Chubb, Edison Scores and ScoresAgain in Boston, 80 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 205 (Nov. 1998) (applauding the success of Edison run schools), with Peter Schrag,
"F"is for Fizzle: The FalteringSchool PrivatizationMovement, 26 AM. PROSPECT 67 (MayJune 1996), and Peggy Farber, 79 PM DELTA KAPPAN 506 (Mar. 1998) (casting doubt on
effectiveness of Edison-run schools).
152. For a defense ofparental prerogatives in this regard, see Steven Gilles,A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 937 (1996). For a critique of this practice, see JAMEs G. DWYER,
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V.CHILDREN'S RiGHTs (1998) (suggesting that some parents have aims
in choosing schools different from giving their children a good secular education).
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Charter schools, for example, are public schools that operate
outside many of the rules and regulations of school-board run public
schools. 5 The idea is that bureaucracy stifles innovation and,
consequently, charter schools serve as "incubators for new ideas
that can be adapted by the public schools."1"" By competing with
state-managed public schools, however, charters are inextricably
linked to vouchers and, not surprisingly, generally opposed by
teachers unions, who see them as a wedge in the war over the
future of public education. 5
Much more than vouchers, where longstanding support of public
education stands as an extraordinary roadblock to an across-theboard voucher experiment, charters portend a dramatic restructuring of public schooling. Over the past decade, the charter school
movement has caught fire: thirty-six states and the District of
Columbia have authorized charter schools, and in 1998 Congress
enacted The Charter School Expansion Act of 1998,156 fostering the
development of high-quality charters. 5 ' At the same time, the
voucher wars paved the way for charters, a mechanism to allow for
school choice without abandoning public schooling. In this way,
today's fight over vouchers seems linked to a broader debate about
markets and schooling and, more generally, to an increasing shift
towards privatization.
MeasuringEducationalQuality
More than anything, the changing social meaning of school
vouchers is a by-product of a growing skepticism of the quality of

153. For overviews of charter schools and the charter school movement, see Bulnan &

Kirp, supranote 66, at 36,52-60; David Osborne, Healthy Competition,NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
4, 1999, at 31.
154. Bulman & Kirp, supra note 66, at 54. Typiially created by parents, these schools
receive their fundingfrom public school systems onaper-student basis. As such, the lifeblood
of charter schools is parental choice: to succeed, these schools must attract and keep
students.
155. See Osborne, supranote 153.
156. Pub. L. No. 105-278, 112 Stat. 2682 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
157. On the growth of charters, see Bulman & Kirp supra note 66, at 52-53. See also 144
CONG. REC. S12246 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Senator Coats).
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instruction in our public schools.'5 8 In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education published A Nation at Risk,
a scathing report about the nation's educational system.'5 9 In
language that became a battle cry to the modern school reform
movement, the Report began by declaring
Our nation is at risk.... [Tihe educational foundations of our
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of
mediocrity ....
... If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on
America the mediocre educational performance that exists
today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war."6°
A Nation at Risk had a galvanizing effect. Ronald Reagan
abandoned his campaign to dismantle the Department of
Education; state lawmakers began exploring merit pay for teachers,
raising high school graduation requirements, and initiating student
competency exams; and education moved to the front burner of
newspapers and network news. 161 And while the report did not call
for vouchers or other private-school-focused reform, its emphasis on
teaching basics, higher achievement standards, and parental
involvement called attention to the differences between public and
private schools.
158. Mypoint here is that public attitudes towards the comparative advantages ofpublic
versus private schools have changed. And while I think there is sound empirical support
justifying this changed attitude, the point I am makingis about the changing social meaning
of vouchers, not the soundness of vouchers as a matter of education policy.
159. See NATIONAL COmMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION OF Risic THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983) (transmitting to Secretary of Education,
Terrel H. Bell, the findings of the Commission's inquiry on the quality of education in the
United States).
160. Id&
161. See TERREL H. BELL, THE THIRTEENTH MAN 114-59 (1988). Notwithstanding this
widespread support for A Nation at Risk, some defenders of public schooling argue that
America's public schools in fact have done a remarkable job educating a diverse citizenry. For
recent articulations of this argument, see Peter Schrag, The Near-Myth of Our Failing
Schools, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1997, at 72. Furthermore, since the release ofA Nation
atRisk, public schools have become more demanding and, consequently, there has been a
modest rise in achievement tests and other measures of student quality. See Thomas M.
Smith, FINDINGS FROM THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 1994 No. 1: HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

TEN YEARs AER uANATIONAT RIsK (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational
Research and Improvement 1995).
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In the years following A Nation at Risk, social scientists and
others have released numerous reports calling attention both to the
strengths of private schools and the weaknesses of public ones.162
And while the findings of some of these studies have been
challenged, 6 ' these studies nevertheless have played an
instrumental role in shaping public discourse concerning schoolchoice proposals. Of particular significance, a 1990 study by John
Chubb and Terry Moe concluded that the problem with public
schools was that they were the product of an institutional setting
that was highly bureaucratized and subject to centralized control,
which negatively affects everything from teacher morale and
professionalism to union influence to choice of curriculum. 6 '
Private schools, in contrast, were subject to market control, which
leads to a decentralized system that is competitive and,
consequently, more effectively organized.'65
Consider, for example, the following studies comparing student
performance in private and public schools. A 1990 Rand
Corporation study of minority students and those from low-income
families found that students in Catholic high schools averaged 803
on the SAT, compared with 642 by those in regional public schools
and 715 by those in magnet schools. 66 In addition, Catholic high
school students score higher on government-sponsored tests: 3.6%
162. BeforeA Nation atRisk, in 1981, James Coleman and others released a significant,
controversial study concluding that private high schools provide a better education than
public ones. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 75; see also Richard J. Murnane, A Review
Essay-Comparisonsof Public and Private Schools: Lessons from the Uproar,19 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 263 (1984) (discussing Coleman and his critics).
163. For a sampling of criticisms of John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe's Politics, Markets,
and American Schools, discussed infra notes 164-65, see CarolAscher, 64 HARv. EDUC. REV.
209 (1994); Eugene F. Provenzo, 519 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 219 (Jan. 1992); Nicholas Lemann, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1991, at 101.
164. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(Brookings Institution 1990).
165. For Chubb and Moe, increasing the funding of public schools would not cure this
fundamental flaw in public education. Private schools spend less per pupil than public ones,
including less on teacher salaries. See id. at 103,144. Ultimately, even if family background,
socioeconomic status, and other factors were held constant, private schools would inevitably
outperform public ones, for students gain from attending an effectively organized school. See
id. at 129.
166. See U.S. CatholicSecondary Schools, Fact Sheet, at http:/www.ncea.org/NewsInfo/
FactSheets. It is also noteworthy that African American and Latino students who graduate
from Catholic high schools are three times more likely to earn a college degree (25%
compared to 8.5%). See id
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in math, 7.9% in reading, and 3.76% in science.' 67 More tellingly, a
1998 study of four urban school districts where some type of school
choice program is in place found that "reading and math scores are
higher, per pupil costs are lower, segregation by race, income, and
ethnicity is unaffected, parents are more involved in the schools,
the curriculum is more challenging, and the environment is more
disciplined." 68 Finally, a controversial August 2000 study
comparing public and private school students with similar
motivations and family backgrounds found that some students
participating in voucher programs have moved ahead of their public
school classmates. 6 9

Over time, of course, one or more of these studies may be called
into question. 7 The fact remains that religion has taken a back
seat in today's debate over school vouchers. The focus, instead, is
education quality, something that recent polling data reinforces.

For example, educational quality is cited as the most important
factor of parents' decisions to participate in Cleveland's and
Milwaukee's targeted voucher plans.1 7 Teaching approach and
167. See id.
168. McConnell, supranote 1, at 850.
169. See William G. Howell et al., Test-Score Effects ofSchool Vouchers in Dayton, Ohio,
New York City, and WashingtonD.C.: Evidencefrom Randomized Field Tests (Sept. 2000),
athttp'/data.fas.harvar'edulpepg.htmL Voucherproponents also contend that school choice
will facilitate good citizenship. For example, arguing that public schools are obligated to
balance the dramatically different values of a multicultural society, Michael McConnell
claims that the problem with public schools is that they cannot teach from a morally coherent
perspective. See MichaelW. McConnell, EducationDisestablishment.WhyDemocraticValues
are Ill-Served by DemocraticControlof Schooling, NOMOS (forthcoming, copy on file with
author). In contrast, because dissenters can go elsewhere, private schools "are in a better
position to teach from a coherent perspective.... [They] are less tempted to water down the
moral curriculum forthe purpose ofavoiding controversy. Moreover, as institutions of choice,
they are likely to experience a greater degree of cooperation between families and schools."
Id. at 51. For a competing view, see Macedo, supra note 111 (arguing that government
regulation, not decentralization, is the only way to ensure that schools participating in
voucher programs advance liberal democratic values).
170. The August 2000 study has already drawn some criticism. See Jay Mathews, Scores
Improve for D.C. Pupilswith Vouchers, WASH. POsT, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al, availablein 2000
WL 25412776; Kate Zeronke, New Doubt is Cast on Study that Backs Voucher Efforts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A21; see also Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: Beyond the
Numbers, EDUC. Wm, Feb. 23,2000, at 38, availableat http:/www.edweekorg (noting that
"we cannot fully assess [the consequence of market competition in schooling] under the
existing plans").
171. See Kim K. Metcalf& PollyA. Tait, FreeMarket Politicsand PublicEducation:What
is the Cost of Choice?, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 65 (1999).
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style, disciplinary environment, safety, and the general atmosphere
of the school were also cited by an overwhelming number of parents (75%); religion, in contrast, was mentioned by just 37% of
parents.'7 2 National polling data also suggests that public support
for vouchers has steadily grown in recent years. Between 1993 and
1998, opposition to "allowing parents to choose a private school to
attend at public expense" has declined from 74% to 50%, with
support almost doubling (from 24% to 44%). 173 Among parents of
public school students, moreover, 60% now support vouchers (as
compared to 51% in 1994).74 This change in public attitudes, no
doubt, is traceable to the growing recognition that today's fight over
school choice is about educational quality. One consequence of all
this is that religion plays, at best, a minimal role in today's voucher
wars; the focus, instead, is how best to educate our children.

How should courts take into account the changing social meaning
of school choice? Remember, it is both inevitable and desirable that
courts consider changing social conditions." 5 At the same time,
courts are not obligated to approve any and all voucher schemes
simply because the social meaning of school choice has changed over
the past two decades. One can hypothesize, for example, a voucher
scheme that only benefits parents who presently send their children
to church-affiliated schools or, alternatively, a voucher scheme
designed to transform a racially integrated school system into a
segregated one. These proposals are patently unconstitutional; in
these cases, the changing social meaning of school choice is simply
beside the point.
What the changing social meaning of vouchers should do is affect
the ways that judges understand the facts before them. A voucher
scheme that, in 1980, undermined both equal educational
opportunity and the Establishment Clause might, in 2000, seem
perfectly acceptable. In part, this means that Establishment Clause
172. See id.
173. See The 30thAnnual PhiDelta Kappa/GallupPollsofthe Public'sAttitudesTowards
the Public Schools, at http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kp9809-1a.htm (lastmodifiedAug. 12,
1998). African American parents are far more supportive of vouchers than are whites. See
supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part I.
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or equal protection doctrine might be recalibrated to reflect
changing conditions. 78 But even if doctrine is left alone,
judges-when applying facts to law-should consider the social
meaning of the facts before them."
There is a chicken-and-egg aspect to the above analysis. After all,
the proposed voucher plan itself contributes to the social meaning
of school choice. Consequently, if nearly all beneficiaries of a
voucher scheme are religious parents who send their children to
church-affiliated schools, it is quite likely that vouchers will be seen
as a spoils system designed to reward powerful religious interests.
For this reason, a court sensitive to this social meaning will be
inclined to strike down the plan under a rigid separationist
analysis. But if the beneficiaries of a voucher scheme are poor
inner-city students attending failing schools, the social meaning
suggests a quite different outcome.
What then of today's voucher schemes? Let me start with the
three most visible plans-those in Florida, Cleveland, and

176. For example, the Rehnquist Court helped bring an end to court-ordered busing by
embracing local control of schools. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Establishment
Clause doctrine has also changed in ways that are consistent with the changing social
meaning of church-state relations. See supranotes 68-81. In particular, the wall ofseparation
has given way to a greater receptivity to a nondiscrimination principle, that is, a principle
more accepting of aid programs that benefit both secular and sectarian organizations. Along
the same lines, the Court is increasingly receptive to direct governmental aid that benefits
the secular education functions of parochial schools. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997) (overturning Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Mitchell v. Helms 120 S. Ct.
2530 (2000).
177. In otherwords, evenifjudges adhere to separationist Establishment Clause doctrine,
the changing social meaning of school vouchers should affect their understanding of, for
example, whether the effect of a voucher scheme is to advance religion. Needless to say, some
adherents to separationist decision making think that church-affiliated schools cannot help
but proselytize. For example, through the display of religious symbols and other
denominational trappings, some separationists are of the view that the participation of
church-afliated schools in a voucher plan necessarily establishes religion. I do not doubt the
sincerity of these strict separationists (nor the legitimacy of strict separationism in, say, the
1970s). For my purposes, however, it does not matter whether some separationists
legitimately fear vouchers. Rather, in calling attention to why courts should pay attention
to social meaning and how the social meaning of vouchers has changed over the past two
decades, my claim is that courts should not employ outdated thinking in their application of
Establishment Clause doctrine. Of course, once a voucher scheme is put into effect, the
experiences of nonadherents attending church-affiliated schools may affect the social
meaning of school vouchers. In other words, it is possible-albeit unlikely-that the
pendulum may shift back towards separationist decision making.
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Milwaukee.17 In all three cases, vouchers were seen as a way out
for poor students attending failing schools. Florida limited
eligibility to students from public schools that failed to meet
minimum state performance standards for two consecutive years.'79
In Cleveland, the plan was enacted in response to a 1995 federal
court order finding that the city was incapable of managing its
public schools and demanding that the state take over direct
supervision and management of these schools. 8 ° Among other
problems, Cleveland's public schools were beset by chronic financial
problems, proficiency test scores that ranked in the bottom 10% of
the country, and a failure to eliminate segregated schools within the
District.8 Finally, Milwaukee's plan was also prompted by18 poor
2
academic achievement, especially among minority students.
In responding to the problem of failing schools, Florida,
Cleveland, and Milwaukee limited participation to a small number
of students. In Milwaukee, 6,000 out of 107,000 students get
vouchers; in Cleveland, 4,000 out of 77,000 received vouchers; and
in Florida, it is estimated that roughly 12,000 of the state's 2.3
million students would get vouchers." Of those students who
received vouchers, the overwhelming majority were poor, minority
students attending racially isolated schools. In Milwaukee, program
eligibility is limited to families with an income at or below 175% of
the federal poverty level ($24,900 for a family of three).'
Furthermore, with a failed court-ordered busing plan (in 1990, at
least twenty-two of Milwaukee's schools were all African American)
178. Of the three, Milwaukee's plan survived court challenge. See Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1998) (holding that the Milwaukee Parental Choice program does not
violate the Establishment Clause). The Florida voucher plan is subject to ongoing litigation.
In Cleveland, a federal appellate court concluded that that city's voucher scheme violated the
federal Establishment Clause. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948, (6th Cir.
2000).
179. See Pamela Mercer, FailureHolds New Fearfor FloridaSchools, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 1999, at A32.
180. See generally Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland Scholarshipand TutoringProgram:
Why Voucher ProgramsDo Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103
(1997).
181. See id. at 1109-10; see also Miller, supranote 5, at 16 (noting that "[o]nly two percent
of Cleveland's minority tenth-graders have taken algebra").
182. See SUsANMITcHELL,HOwScHOOLCHoIcEALMOSTDIEDINWISCoNSIN5 (Wis. Policy
Research Inst. Report, Sept. 1999).
183. See Miller, supra note 5, at 16. These are 1999 statistics.
184. See MITCHELL, supranote 182, at 20 n.26.
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and significant test score disparities between African American and
white students, the voucher plan was a salve of sorts for the city's,
AfricanAmerican community.'85 In Cleveland, vouchers were given
to all parents whose income was below 200% of the poverty line,
with the balance distributed by lottery (with the lottery weighted
to prefer poor parents).8 Moreover, because 70% of its families are
minorities, Cleveland's voucher scheme principally benefitted
African Americans burdened both by a failing public school system
and a failed desegregation plan.8 7 In Florida, according to
Republican Governor Jeb Bush, the voucher plan was part of a
comprehensive reform designed to help poor families achieve high
standards of learning. 88 In other words, although eligibility was
defined by a school's poor academic performance, it was anticipated
that most failing schools would be located in school systems where
a disproportionate number of parents were poor.
When it comes to church-affiliated schools, Florida, Cleveland,
and Milwaukee allowed these schools, along with nonsectarian
schools, to participate in their voucher programs. To protect against
prosteltyzing, all three programs placed some restrictions on
religious schools. In Milwaukee, participating religious schools
must abide by an opt-out provision allowing parents to have their
children exempted from religious activities.' 89 In Cleveland,
participating schools may not discriminate or teach hatred on the
basis of religion. 90 Finally, in Florida, participating schools "would
need to accept students without consideration of their past
academic performance and on a religion-neutral basis. They would

185. See FixingMPS,MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Nov. 26,1995, at 18, availablein 1995 WL

12839316; Milwaukee's Schools; Polly'sPlan,ECONOMIST, Aug. 4,1990, at 21. The plan was
sponsored byDemocratic state representative Annette "Polly" Williams, an AfricanAmerican
who maintained that "a decent education is more important than artificial racial
integration." Id. at 22. Among the city's African American community, moreover, the plan
enjoys overwhelming support. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
186. See Lessons Cleveland Can Teach, ECONoMIST, Nov. 29, 1997, at 27.

187. See Suffer the Children,WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1999, at A18.
188. See Anjetta McQueen, Jeb Bush Pushes Vouchers in D.C.,TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Sept. 24, 1999, at B2.
189. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(7)(c) (West 1995). For an argument that the "opt-out"
provision unfairly burdens religious schools, see Loconte, supranote 111, at 30, 34.
190. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(4), (A)(6) (Baldwin 1999).
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not be allowed to compel a student to profess to a specific ideology,
to pray or to worship."19 1
The stories of Florida, Cleveland, and Milwaukee reinforce the
fundamental differences between today's voucher schemes and
earlier proposals. Today, consistent with the changing social
meaning of school choice, voucher plans are about education,
especially the education of poor, minority students in failing school
systems. And while religious schools can participate, this
participation seems hinged to the increasingly visible role that
churches play in providing social services in this era of
privatization. In other words, irrespective of what a court may have
said about school choice in 1980, today's voucher schemes appear a
perfectly reasonable way to improve the lives of our neediest
children.19 2 Needless to say, the implementation of these voucher
schemes might reveal that participating sectarian schools are in
fact discriminating on the basis of religion or race. And what of
more openended proposals-like California's 2000 ballot initiatives
-that would provide a $4,000 across-the-board voucher for all
parents who send their children to private schools? It is one thing
to say that, in the abstract, the social meaning of a targeted voucher
proposal is consistent with equal educational opportunity and
Establishment Clause objectives. It is quite another to generalize
from that conclusion to somehow immunize school choice proposals
from constitutional attack. In the following (and concluding)
section, I will sketch out an argument of how courts can take into
account both the changing social meaning of choice proposals and
the real possibility that, over time, the implementation of voucher
schemes will once again change the social meaning of school choice.

191. JeffireyS. Solochek, PrivateSchoolsMaintainLowProfileon VoucherPlan,SARASOTA

HERALD-TRiB., Mar. 30, 1999, at 1A, availablein 1999 WL 15655156.
192. This is not to say that vouchers are the best way of responding to the problems of

poverty and failing schools. It is just to say that the above described school choice proposals
may be a part of the solution, not the problem.
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CONCLUSION: TAKING SOCIAL MEANING INTO ACCOUNT

This Essay has shown why it is that the social meaning of school
choice has, over the past, two decades, undergone a radical
transformation. Many of the shifts leading up to this change-the
advent ofprivatization, the ever-growing role ofnondenominational
social outreach efforts of the Catholic Church, and the demise of
court-ordered school desegregation-seem enduring. At the same
time, with civil rights leaders, church-state separationists, teachers
unions, and others still opposing school choice, it is clear that the
social meaning of vouchers remains contested. Consider, for
example, California's just defeated across-the-board voucher
proposal. 9 ' For some, this scheme is about educational quality, or
improving schools through competition; for others, it is a way to
encourage racial and religious separatism. 9 4And while the targeted
voucher plans of Florida, Cleveland, and Milwaukee avoid most of
the problems presented by the California plan, it is nevertheless
true that participating sectarian schools can subvert the
antiproselytizing provisions of these choice programs. For example,
the informational materials of one of the participating schools in
Cleveland's choice program states that "total religious instruction
is the major focus of the educational program .... Lessons learned
in formal religious classes are purposefully carried over into all
"
subject areas. 195

What then is a court to do? On the one hand, it ought not
foreclose voucher experiments. After all, the changing social
meaning of school choice suggests that vouchers neither violate
equal educational opportunity nor Establishment Clause
prohibitions. Moreover, vouchers may prove to be the best way for
poor inner-city students to escape failing school systems. 96 In other
193. See Martha Graves & Duke Helfund, Schools PrepareFreshSet ofBond Issues,L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A3.
194. Compare Minow, supra note 96 (calling attention to the risks of voucher schemes),
with Paul E. Peterson, Monopoly and Competition inAmerican Education,in 1 CHOICE AND
CONTROL INAMERIcAN EDUCATION (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) (noting
that school choice is a necessary response to the unresponsive and inefficient public school
monopoly).
195. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (omission in
original).
196. This might be true, for example, ifa fimdamental retooling ofpublic schools is either
impossible (because of political forces favoring privatization) or unwise (because markets

work). Furthermore, the market forces that make charter schools a very real possibility for
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words, absolutist decision making blocking voucher experiments in
the name of the Constitution might well place an outdated
obstacle
19 7
in the way of critically important education reform.
For this very reason, a federal district court and an appeals court
in Cleveland were wrong to strike down that city's voucher scheme
on Establishment Clause grounds."9 ' True, the mission statements
of some of the participating schools in the Cleveland program
suggested that these schools were pervasively religious.199 True, the
failure of public schools in the surrounding suburbs to opt into the
program limited student choice to predominantly church-affiliated
private schools.0 0 Nevertheless, it is quite possible that program
guidelines forbidding religious-based discrimination in either
admissions or teaching would have been sufficient to prevent
possible abuses. 01 Furthermore, the Ohio legislature, over time,
may have mandated the participation of suburban schools (whose
decision to opt out reinforced pervasive racial isolation). More to the
point, by rigidly applying the Establishment Clause precedents of
another era, the Cleveland district and appeals courts embraced a
standard of review that would foreclose the participation of
sectarian schools in voucher experiments. And in so doing, given
the middle class may not extend to inner-city neighborhoods. See Arthur Levine, Why I'm
Reluctantly Backing Vouchers, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1998, at A28 (noting that vouchers
"offer poor children a way out of the worst schools" and, in so doing, "encourage the creation
of strong urban schools").
197. See Jeremy Rabkin, Racial Divisions and Judicial Obstructions,in REDEFINING
EQUALIT, supranote 22, at 90-94 (condemning court-created constitutional roadblocks that
stand in the way of innovative solutions for pressing social problems).
198. See Simmons-Harris,72 F. Supp. 2d. at 834.
199. See id. at 837-38; see also Scott Stephens & Mark Vosburgh, Voucher School Relies
on Videos as Teachers,Operatorsto Appeal,Being Cut FromProgram,CLEv. PLAIN DEALER,
July 10,1999, at 1A (explaining that newspaper reporters discovered that a Christian school
that had been receiving voucher money under the Cleveland program relied entirely on
Christian videos and workbooks for instruction, and that state officials told the school
operators they would have to "complement its video-based curriculum with other classroom
instruction" in order to remain a voucher school). For a description of ways in which some
religious schools might, because of their religious mission, fail to serve the state's aim of
providing children with a good secular education, see DWYER, supra note 152.
200. See JodiWilgoren,A Ruling Voids Use of Vouchers in Ohio Schools, N.Y. TIMS, Dec.
12, 2000, at A 1 (noting that "96 percent of the 3,761 voucher students attended sectarian
schools").
201. While some church-affiliated schools will refuse to participate in a voucher program
for precisely this reason, the Supreme Court has approved such across-the-board conditions
on eligibility in government-funded programs. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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both the paucity of nonsectarian private schools in Cleveland and
the political obstacles of compelling suburban school participation,
the district court decision may have killed any and all voucher
experiments in Cleveland. Considering the well-documented
failings of Cleveland's public schools, 0 2 the consequences of such
absolutist premature decision making are truly tragic.
At the same time, it would be equally problematic for the courts
to engage in absolutism in the opposite direction, that is, by
employing a standard of review that would uphold any and all
choice proposals. The concerns of the federal district and appeals
courts in Cleveland were not baseless. And that was with a targeted
voucher scheme; a free-market plan allowing participating schools
to discriminate on the basis of religion (let alone race) would raise
even more profound constitutional problems.0 3
Lower-court judges should engage in a type of minimalist
decision making that allows states and municipalities to
experiment with targeted voucher plans.20 4 Once courts, politicians,
and the people see how these limited plans operate, the social
meaning of vouchers may again change. For example, if these plans
are successful, the scope and sweep of voucher programs may be
expanded to reflect a growing belief in market-based solutions. 5
But if these plans do little more than facilitate religious
proselytizing by church-affiliated schools, the social meaning of
vouchers will need to take into account the risks of church-state
entanglements.
Over time, the social meaning of choice may solidify, paving the
way for the Supreme Court to issue a more definitive decision on
the constitutionality of school choice. Until that time, however, the
202. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
203. See Minow, supra note 96.
204. For a defense of minimalist decision making by both the lower courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE ATATIME: JUDICIAL MnmumsM ON THE
SUPREME CouRT (1999). Sunstein's embrace of minimalism, however, does not call upon
courts to uphold governmental programs when their social meaning is contested. For an
argument that courts should uphold governmental action when social meaning is contested,

see Lessig, supra note 3.
205. Today, however, it is hard to imagine an across-the-board voucher plan having
enough political currency to get through the electoral process. California voters
overwhelmingly rejected such a proposal with exit polls showing strong opposition cutting
across all demographic categories. See Graves & Helfund, supra note 193.

962

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:919

Court would be well advised to steer clear of the voucher issue.0 6
For this reason, the Justices are to be commended for resisting
temptation and denying certiorari in Jackson v. Benson,2A7 a case

challenging the Wisconsin
Milwaukee's voucher plan.

Supreme

Court's

approval

of

The future of school choice ought to be decided by parents,
interest groups, and elected officials. Judges, at least for now,
should steer clear of this fight by upholding targeted voucher
proposals on narrow grounds. The stakes of the education reform
debate are simply too high for courts to engage in absolutist
decision making (either approving or invalidating all voucher
schemes). Rather, by standing back and letting the school choice
wars unfold, judges can help see to it that our constitutional law is
informed by facts, not biases.
In proposing that courts look before they leap, I am, of course,
urging judges to heed changing social conditions. Hardly radical,
this proposal comports with the Supreme Court's practice of
measuring their decision making against prevailing social norms.' °
More to the point, courts cannot absorb the costs of preempting
legitimate (perhaps necessary) educational reform by embracingthe
social meaning and, with it, constitutional doctrine of another era.
Rather, to preserve their place in government and facilitate
constructive constitutional discourse, courts cannot impose their
understanding of constitutionally relevant facts on either the people
or their elected representatives.

206. In other words, unlike lower courts, the Supreme Court ought to issue maximalist
decisions. Otherwise, the Supreme Court will be little more than a technocrat and, as such,
will play no meaningful role either in directing lower courts or in engaging the elected

branches in a constitutional dialogue with each other. See Neal Devins, The DemocracyForcingConstitution, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1986-87 (1999).
207. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
208. See supra Part I.

